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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALK 811' BANK AND TRUST 
COMPA::\Y, Administrator of the 
E:~tates of' jl IXNI~TTA \V AiLKER, 
nka ~·n~TT IJi: \VALE ER, deceased, 
<md lLA MINN J1 ~rl1 11A vV ALKER, 
(l(·cemwd, and JOHN A. WALKER, 
d(•('f'at;ed, and R. J~. \VALKER, 
mn1 A ·w ALKER G ROCK and Case 
,\LTA F'AY WALKBR LAKE, No. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 10286 
and 
~\c:;TJ:0; \r.ALKEH, 
Involuntary Plaintiff, 
YS 
.J. B. ·w ALK ER, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This i:-; a civil action by which plaintiffs-appellants 
urig·11iall>» sought to have a constructive trust in their 
favor imposed upon certain parcels of real property, 
1 
record title to which was in defendant-respondent. ThP 
real property constitutes the bulk of the estate of .John 
A. \Valker, Deceased, and the parties are his heirs, or 
their personal representatives. 
The complaint alleged defendant acted on behalf 
of plaintiffs, or their predecessors in interest, in recov-
ering title to the real property after it had been taken 
by creditors through mortgage foreclosures or execu-
tion sales (R. 1, para. 6 and 12). By his answer, defen-
dant denied any trusteeship or any beneficial interest 
in plaintiffs or any of them (R. 9-10). 
Thereafter, a written agreement between the parties 
(Exh. P-7) was located supporting plaintiff's conten-
tions. By the time of pre-trial, defendant had admitted · 
the genuineness of this 1922 agreement (R. 76-78), which 
provided that he should have only a lien in the property 
and that his lien should be limited to the amount he per-
sonally paid in satisfying certain previous liens against 
the property, plus interest. 
1Trial proceeded on the theory that defendant held 
title only to secure his lien and subject to an obligation 
to convey the property to his co-heirs when the amount 
of his lien had been paid to him. The purpose of the 
trial was to determine the amount of defendant's lien 
and to enforce his obligation to make appropriate con-
veyance upon the satisfaction of the lien (R. 107; 113). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court determined the amount of defendant-
respondent's lien to be $21,757.36, of which $5,614.00 is 
2 
principal and $1G,1-l-3.3G is interest. It ruled that plain-
tifi'I' \niuld havt> 30 days after demand by defendant to 
pay tl1is a111ount, and if the payment were not made 
,rithin that period, defendant would be released from 
any obligation to convey plaintiff's property interest to 
tlwm ( R :)3). 
In making this determination, the trial court acknow-
ledged that sonie or all of the $5,614.00 was actually paid 
by a 11artnership of which defendant was at most an 
p(1ual partner with plaintiff R. E. Walker (R. 419; 
R. Ji'l). The court nevertheless gave defendant full 
credit for all pay1rn~nts made by the partnership and held 
defendant was entitlted to interest at 8% per annum 
from the time those payments were made. 
The court failed to make any finding as to tl1e 
extent to which payments made by the partnership (and 
for whielt defendant was given full credit) were made to 
~atisfy obligations which the partnership had to the 
J1~state of John A. vV alker, Deceased, although it was 
tlu~ contention of plaintiffs that the partnership had 
used at least $1,250.00 of the $5,614.00, and therefore, 
by paying $1,~50.00 of the total was only fulfilling its 
obligation to repay. 
'I1he court further held that, upon defendant's pur-
chase, in June of 1959, of plaintiff R. E. Walker's stock 
in a corporation which had acquired some of the assets 
of the partnership, defendant acquired any right R. E. 
Walker might have had to be reimbursed for payments 
rnadcc' hy the partnership in the acquisition of the prop-
c~rty involved in this case. 
3 
-
ltELIEl;' 80UG1IT O:\ APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-appellant:::; S('Pk to have the canse re1naiid-
ed with instructions to the trial court that it ddPl'rnilJP 
the amount of respond<c~nfs li,•n hy the following adju~I 
men ts to ifa decree: 
(a) Deduct $1,230.00 from tlw $5,(il-t.OO lll'incipal 
amount in the decree. 'rl1is is one-fourth of the $3,00~.~ill 
paid by tht• parhwrship to penwns nauwd Dayton on a 
mortgage obligation, and represents $1,000.00 bono1rn] 
by the partnership for ih; business purposes on June 4, 
1918. 'l'he partners used the estate property as secmity 
for the loan, giving a mortgage on it ( Exh. P-28; Entn· 
28 of Exh. D-30). One-fourth of the money borro1rPd 
on the Dayton note and mortgage had been used to pa)· 
off this $1,000.00 indebtedness. (R-228) 
(b) Deduct from the balance 58.318 per cent 0t 
whatever amount was actually paid by the partner~hip 
(as opposed to defendant personally) in satisfying the 
liens to which the 1922 contract relates. rrhe. 38.31S~i 
represents the interest of R. E. vValker in the partnership 
capital as of the time the partnership discontinued it 
active business operations, and making this deduction 
would give defendant reimbursement for his sharr of 
the partnership's payments. 
( d) Deduct $250.00 from the remammg principal 
amount by reason of a payment received by respondent 
in 19-±2 for a right of way over the subject propert)-
granted to \Vest Side vVater System (Entry 106, Ex!L 
D-30), and adjust the interest computation for this 19-}~ 
receipt by defendant. 
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i '') !Zc•(·ornpufr tlw interest payment on the principal 
c'illtt nl':·i\·(·;l at liy thi· for<>going adjustments. 
I 11 tlw altl'rnative, appellants seek to have this Court 
l'tod; t\· tl1e DPeret~ relative to the amount due respondent 
011 !ti;-; li(·11 to a total of $G,43G.31, consisting of principal 
in the a1:10mit of $1,394.G7 and interest in the amount of 
$;),0+ 1.0-1-. 'l'h('i-i(~ amounts are arrived at as follo\vs: 
Prim:ipal Amount of Respondent's 
per Dec.:ree -------------------------------------
Le::::s: Partnership obligation 
satisfied with proceeds from 
Dayton note and mortgage --------
Balance _____ ------------------------------------
LeRs: RE. Walker's Share of 
partnership capital per partner-
shi pbooks, not recoverable by 
rec;pondent ( 58.318 % of 
$cl "-QL1. 00) __ -.. --.. ----- --- ----· ---·--------·-·· 
Ba!D.nce 
Less: Amount received by 
Respondent for right of way _____ _ 
Balance ------------------------------------------
Plus: Interest as follows: 
8% of $1,819.00 for 20 years 
(I 922-42) ---------------------------------- $2,910.40 
8% of $1,569.00 for 22 years 
(l!M2-64) ---------------------------------- 2,761.44 
$5,614.00 
($1,250.00) 
$4,364.00 
( $2,545.00) 
$1,819.00 
($ 250.00) 
$1,5'69.00 
Total Interest ____________________ $5,671.84 
Total Amount of respondent's 
expenditures and interest _______ _ $7,240.84 
Eight-Ninths of Above 
figure =$6,436.31. 
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from 1919 until 192± when he got married. He was run. 
ning the teams and working on the farm. J. B. \Valhi· 
had several jobs until 1920 when he devoted his full ef-
fort to the hauling business (R. 387; R. 218). The naturp 
of the entity which operated the hauling business was not 
expressed in any formal instrument, but the business 
was known as the J. B. and R. 1£. Vv alker Truckina 
b 
Company ( R. 362), and was represented to be a part. 
nership of J. B. \Valker and R. 1£. vValker (R. 222-220; 
R. 383). 
In 1917, the business obtained a truck, and Minetta 
vV alker mortgaged a portion of the family property to 
obtain loans for this purpose ( Exh. P-29, R. 220). Tht>re-
af ter, another truck was acquired, and J. B. and R. E. 
Walker mortgaged their interest in the estate property 
to obtain the down payment for this truck in the amount 
of $1,000.00. (Exh. P-28; R. 221; R. 183; R. 378). The 
latter mortgage was placed on the property in June of 
1918 (Exh. P-28). 
On July 12, 1920, a mortgage covering the orange 
property was given to secure a $±,000.00 loan made by all 
of the heirs of J olm A. Walker. (Entry 39 of Exh. D-30). 
Of the $±,000.00 obtained, $1,000.00 was used to discharge 
the mortgage of J. B. and R. E. vValker which had been 
placed on the property to get the second truck. (R. 228; 
R. 183; Marginal Release, Exh. P-28). This mortgage 
of July 12, 1920, will be referred to as the Dayton mort-
gage in this brief. Having used $1,000.00 of the $4,000.00 
received on the Dayton note and mortgage to discharge 
their debt for the truck, J. B. and R. E. Walker's truck-
8 
ing 1inrtn('}'sltip had a clear duty to pay off at least one-
fomtlt or tlw Dayton mortgage debt. 
Tlw Dayton mortgag<~ was not paid and a judgment 
\\'a~; cntt·n·d in .January of 1922. The property was sold 
nt a slwriff's sale on February 10, 1922 to l\lr. Dayton 
(Entry OG of Exh. D-30). 
ln ~eptt~mber of 1919 and April of 1922, two judg-
mc•nts were rendered against the Union Co-operative 
)fprcantik Company (the store was operated by the 
fmnily in this name) in favor of the Utah Association of 
Credit Men, and the green parcels of land were subse-
(iiwntly sold on a sheriff's sale for $250.00 and $25.00 
l'('Speetivel y (En tries 53 and 56 of Exh. D-30). 
In this setting, the family entered into the agree-
rnen ts which are dated October 9, 1922 (Exh. P-5, P-7). 
Urn· of th<:•se is between members of the family and the 
Daytons which is a contract for the purchase by the 
family of the orange tract of land from the Daytons, 
direding that a deed running to respondent be delivered 
upon final payment of a purchase price of $5,002.50. 
rrJip ot]H'l' contract is between the members Of the family 
tlH!lllselves \vhich provides that respondent will make 
a diligt-nt effort, although he is in no sense obligated, 
to pay th<~ Dayton mortgage, expenses of administration 
of his father's estate and expenses in pursuing a con-
',1emnatiou case which was then pending. The contract 
abo provided that respondent would have a lien against 
the prn1ierty for all "payments made by second party 
[respondent] pursuant to the terms of this agreement." 
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Although there is some question about when the signa. 
tures of the parties were affixed and by vYhom, tb
1 
adult mt-mbers of the family entered into the contract 
\Vithout question, the Dayton obligation was sati~ 
fied. Further, the Union properties were assigned tu 
respondent by sheriff's deeds. There is also no question 
about the source of these payments. Essentially all or 
the moneys paid for these properties came from the 
trucking business. ( R. 228-229; R. 362). The books or 
account of the J.B. and R. E. trucking company partner-
ship show the properties as partnership assets. (Exl1. 
D-26; Exh. P-27 ; Exh. P-32; R. 235) 
vVhen partnership funds were expended for th1, 
purpose for which respondent seeks to establish a lien 
in the amount of the entire expenditure, the expenditures 
were set up on the books as partnership real estate and 
were not charged to respondent's capital account. (H. 
272-273). 
All of the family continued to live in the family home 
until 1920, when Fay Walker left. In 1924 R. E. Walker 
was married and moved out of the home. (R. 309; R.211) 
J. B. Walker and his family lived in the home with his 
mother and the younger children until 1931. (R. 211) 
In July of 1933, a corporation, J.B. and R. E. Walk-
er, Inc. was formed. Five Thousand shares of $1.00 par 
were issued, mainly to J.B. and R. E. Walker. According 
to the Articles of Incorporation, the corporation received, 
as consideration for the shares so issued, exactly this: 
10 
"The good ·will and business created bv the 
co-partnPrship of J. B. and R. E. "\Valker." (Exh. 
D-2f)) 
;\ t the corporation~s inception, there were no ledger 
aceonnts established, and the only book ever maintained 
1rns a ea::;h book, which did not show the assets and liabil-
ities of the business. (R. 267-268). 
nw only indicia of ownership of partnership assets 
which \\'('l'P transfered to the corporation were the cer-
tificatPs of title to the trucks as they were registered for 
lieense plates. (R 195; R. 259). The stocks and secur-
ities of the partnership were not transferred to the cor-
poration (H. 194; R. 404-405) No conveyance of the 
.J olm A. YI' alker Estate property was ever made to the 
corporation by any instrument, recorded or otherwise. 
As of DecPmber 31, 1932, the last time that partner-
ship tntl'ies were made, the capital account of J. B. 
\Yalb~r amounted to $29,143.30 and that of R. E. Walker 
was $40,775.01 (R. 272). Of the total capital in the 
partnership, R. E. vValker had 58.318 per cent, and J. B. 
WalkN had 41.682 per cent. The corporation stock was 
iswe1l equally to J. B. and R. E. ·walker (Exh. D-25) . 
.l'ilr. Cope, a certified public accountant, testified 
that he had examined the books of the partnership and 
reeords of the corporation over an extended period be-
t\\'PPn 1\1 arch 1958 and September 1958, and that he had 
attempted to reconcile the ending of the partnership 
1rith tlu-\ L<>ginning of the corporation. He found that 
the two eould not be reconciled ( R. Z77). 
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In 1939, J. B. and R. E. \V alker were involved in: 
law suit with one another as a result of ·which res1ion<le111 
bought all of H. K \Valk(~r's stock in the J. B. and Rt 
vValker, Inc. 'l'lw purchase was made pursuant to a 
written agreernen t between them ( Exh. P-31). 1']11. 
agreement (1) reeognizecl that there was still a partner. 
ship having assets subject to conveyance, and ( 2) prn 
vided specifically that respondent was not getting any 
rights in the property of the John A. \V alker Estate. 
The settlement was worked out carefully between the 
parties and their counsel and, with most particular 
language, rest' rved R. E. ·walker's rights in the estate 
property from the assignment. 
Disregarding the clear intent of the parties l'X· 
pressed in the agreement, the trial court ruled that IJ) 
this agreement respondent bought out R. E. vValker's 
interest in the partnership without any reservations. 
Since the partnership had made the payments for th1· 
acquisition of the orange property from the Dayton1 
and the green property from the Utah Association of 
Credit Men, the court concluded that the assignment in 
the 1959 agreement gave respondent the right to reirn-
bursement, under the 1922 agreement, for all rnoneyi 
paid by the partnership. The trial court refused to per· 
mit counsel to examine respondent regarding whiclt 
pay~nents were made by him and which were made by tbe 
partnership ( R. 371). The court ignored the extensin 
provisions of the 1959 agreement expressly reserving 
from the assignment the rights to reimbursement for 
moneys paid on behalf of the J olm A. vValker Estate. 
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F'ollowinµ; thL' trial court's ruling on the effect of 
tlw :'"tlle111P11t agreument, plaintiffs asked leave to 
,1111t·iltl tl1(' conqilaint to assert a bar of the statute of 
Jilllitatiorn-: against n'spondent's lien including any mon-
i» s paid by the partnership, the corporation, or R. E. 
\Yalk<'r ( H. 385). 
The J mrtnership books of account clearly show the 
properties aequired by payments made to the Daytons 
(11ltid1 anwmited to $5,002.50 of the $5,614.00 in the de-
cree) \1·ere picked up and carried as a partnership asset. 
~1imilady, Uie $42G.40 a-vvarded in the decree for the two 
UJJion lots (green property) resulted in an acquisition 
t'l10\rn as au asset of the partnership. (Exh. D-26; R. 235 ). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET-OFF 
AGAINST AMOUNTS PAID BY THE PARTNERSHIP AT 
LEAST $1,250.00 WHICH THE PARTNERSHIP HAD THE 
PRIMARY DUTY TO PAY. 
The Dayton mortgage represented security for a 
$-±,U00.00 Joan made upon the note of all the heirs of 
.John A. \Valker, Deceased. There is no conflict in the 
Pridc'rn:e that, when the money was obtained in 1920, 
$1 !000.00 ( onP-fourth of the $-1,000.00) was required to 
rliseharg<> a previous mortgage placed on the property 
h~-' rt>spmHJrnt and appellant R. E. Walker (Entry 39 
of Exh. D-30; Exh. P-28; R. 183; R.. 228). 
~irnilarly, there is no conflict in the evidence that 
tJ1e> mortgag<> placed on the estate property by respond-
13 
1c~nt and 11. E. \Valker in June of 1918 waa to obtain $1. 
000.00 for a truek used in the partnernhip husim•aa rn. 
221; R. 183). 
It ,,·ould therefore aPlwar clear that, at the moment 
the Dayton mortgage was plact~d upon the property, 
the heirs of J olm A. \V alker would have a claim again,1 
the partnel'Ship and J. B. and R. E. \ValkPr for the $1,-
000.00 debt which had been paid off. 
Following the Dayton foreelosure, the reacquisi-
tion of the pro1wrty by reapondent was made with im·t 
nership funds. ( ~ee stipulation of counsel at page 311 
of the Record; Exh. D-26; R. 235) 
The trial court plainly stated its conviction that 
respondent should be given credit for all payments mad~ 
by himself or the J. B. and R. B. \Valker Trucking part-
nership (R. 370). Further, the court did not permit am 
set-off for the obligations of the partnership to tlw 
John A. "\V alker estate. The propriety of the trial court'i 
ruling relative to giving respondent credit for all pay-
ments made by the partnership will be argued in an-
other point. At this point the merits of the set-off will 
be discussed. 
The 1922 agreement among the members of th~ 
Walker family (Exhibit P-7) constitutes a memorandum 
of the understanding between respondent on the om 
hand and his mother and siblings (some of whom wm 
still minors) on the other. It obligates respondent to du 
nothing except use his best efforts to clear up the Day-
14 
tim i1t1H·tgage matter and other specified expenses. It 
j;; a pnsonal agreement with respondent providing for 
Jii:-: n·i111h:1rs<•J1wnt with interest of money which he pays 
i>tll ol' !iii; own pocket. It gin•s him a lien agaim;t the 
pni]l\'l'l)' l'or sums which he pays. It says nothing about 
tlw 1da]Jfodurn~nt of a liPn in the event the partnership 
or any.inl' <'Is<> makes any of the payments. 
,\pp1·liants will concede the equity of g1vrng re-
~pornh11 en·dit for iiayments made by the partnership 
to tlw {'.Xf (•nt of respondent's interest in the partnership 
1•\'(•1t t!tonglt sneh payments were not technically made by 
!Jim 1\·itl1in the purview of the 1922 agreement. However, 
this er<'dit should be given only after the total payments 
1w.1dP by tlu' partnership have been reduced by the 
;11110unt ,,·Jiieh the partnership owed to the estate. 
Tlu• e\·idence clearly establishes that, by 1918, the 
lr1;c·ki1;~< Jmsin<':·;s \Vas 01wrated as a partnership between 
r1·:sp0Jl(lent and R. E. '\V alker. In l\Iarch of that year, 
I l1Py n•pn·sent<·<l themselves to be a partnership in a pro-
cc1::ding before the I11dustrial Commission (R-222, 223; R. 
:;'):J). Jn .J mie of 1918, they jointly executed a mortgage 
(Jf tlt1 ir interest in the .John A ... Walker Estate above 
rl'l'en1·cl to so they could acquire a truck (Exh. P-28). 
It app1•:u·s from the record that the partnership 
ow1•d the .John A. Walker Estate and the family a great 
\lPnl more than the duty to pay back money borrowed for 
H:'e in th(_• business. r:L'he partnership initially used the 
farm anintals and farm equipment for hauling; it used 
tltt- <';-,;tat~' land as security in borrowing money for 
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trucks, and it u~ed the land as its base of 01wrntiu 11 ., 
feeding and shelkring its temnsten;. rrhe parbwrs tli(•J11 
selves owed a great deal to the family, whieh had ]Jtl 
them through eollegr despite serious financial hardship~ 
and \\'as providing tlwm \rith their own residenePs. T]i, 
store had also served the partnership by providing sui1 
plies and gasoline. (R-21G, 214, 220, 221, 226, 227) 
The value of these goods and services cannnot nu\i. 
be established, and the trial court saw no legal duty 01 
the partnership to pay for them. However, as to tl1t 
$1,000.00 of the Dayton mortgage money which was us0ri 
to discharge the partnership's debt, both the amount allll 
the dirPet benefit an~ clearly established from the t>ri-
dence. rrhe 1922 contract cannot logically or even ration-
ally be construed to mean that respondent should han 
a lien against the estate property if the partnership n-
paid the $1,000.00 of the Dayton mortgage money whiclt 
was used to satisfy its own previous note and mortgage. 
The ruling of the trial court goes even one step fur. 
ther. It provides that respondent is entitled to have tht 
heirs of John A. Vv alker not only reimburse him for the 
money paid by the partnership to discharge its O\rlt 
obligation, but also pay him 3.36 times the amount of thi1 
payment in interest. 
It should be noted that the decree gives respondent 
credit for $5,002.50, being the principal amount the part-
nership paid the Daytons. Since one-fourth of the Day-
ton mortgage money went to the benefit of the partner-
ship, the off-set should be one-fourth of the $5,00~.:J(I 
16 
,·1·1·di1 g'I\'(']) 
~:; 1. ;_:;-;: 1.1 lO. 
rt>spornknt b:-· the trial eourt's Ll(·cn·e or 
' 
\ \' ( · s ii brn it that the trial court l'rred in not allowing 
a :-:d-off or $1,~50.00 against the• $3,Gl-1.00 principal 
amount (1ctnmillcd to he Llue respondent. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RE-
SPONDENT HAD ACQUIRED ALL OF THE PARTNER-
SHIP'S RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTIES OF THE JOHN A. 
WALKER EST A TE. 
TJu, evid(•nce offered m the trial of this case is un-
('ontrowrkd that all monies paid for the re-acquisition 
ot' tlir properties covered by the Dayton mortgage and 
t11os( 1 ineludf'<l in the Utah Association of Credit Men 
execution sale were from the ·walker Trucking Company 
(_·o-parbwrship, in which respondent and appellant R. E. 
\r aJker '\\"('n~ partners. (R. 257; R. 235; Stipulation of 
(·ounse 1 H. :-rt 1, Exh. D-:26 at page 21.) 
The trial eourt repeatedly expressed its conviction 
tlrni n"spond(~nt had finally bought out R. E. ·walker in 
till' partnership which paid the $5,614.00 here in issue, 
a11d hall therefore acquired any right his partner had 
to lw r<'irnlmrscd for partnership funds expended for the 
.1 ohn A. Walker Estate. At page 370 of the record, the 
comt snid: 
"I am going to hold that any money that's 
lwL•n vaid by the partnership or the corporation 
or .T. B. \Valker he is entitled to get eight-ninths 
of' it back." 
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Again, at page 412 of the record, the court said: 
"He may have paid for it by partnershi1) 
funds, but he has bought his partner out.'' 
1 
Also at page 36G-"I of the record, ·we find: 
"l\IR. CUTHBERT: The only reason for 
presenbng nfr. 1Cope's evidence was in rebuttal 
of l\[r. \Valker's statement that he had charged 
all the items to draws that had been paid by the 
partnership. 
•'T HJ~ COURT: This is what I understand, 
and I did not think that made any difference he-
cause lw's bought R. E. \Valker out, and he's 
paid all that's been paid on this." 
The evidence in this case ,,·ill not sustain a finding 
that respondent ever acquired the rights of his partner, 
Appellant R. E. \Valker, to be reimbursed for arnount8 
expended by the partnership for the estate nor that the 
property interests of the partnership in the John A. 
\Valker Estate properties were ever transferred to J. B. 
and R. E. Walker Incorporated. 
Looking first at the question of whether the partner-
ship's interest in the John A. \Valker Estate properties 
was transferred to the corporation, there are several 
factors indicating no transfer vvas ever made or intended 
to be made. 
:B..,irst, there was no com·eyance of any form from 
J. B. Walker, who took record title to the properties, 
to the corporation ( Exh. D-30 ; R. 192-3). Although a 
holding of property in the name of one partner is con-
sistent with its being a partnership asset under Section 
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JU ol' the llniform Partnership Act. (Section 48-1-7, Utah 
( 'ude ,\1111otaiec1, 1953), such a holding is not consistent 
11 i1l1 a l'Orporation 's ownership of an asset. 
Secolld, although the partnership books clearly show 
j!Jc~e assets to be part11ership assets, there is no account-
iug record by which the properties are treated as a cor-
porate assd. 
Thi rel, tlw Articles of Incorporation specifies that 
the eorporation is receiving, in payment for the shares 
ir;r-;1w1l, "tlw good will and business created by the co-
partnL·rship of J. B. & R. E. Walker." This language 
makes llO reference to the transfer of any tangible assets 
of the partnership, nor is it in the broad form frequently 
found iu sud1 documents of all of the assets and liabili-
fa·s of the partnership. The language used is consistent 
\\ith a transfer of only the operating assets of the part-
11,•rship without a transfer of the investment assets. 
Fourth, the capital accounts of J. B. Walker and R. 
K \Valker \Vere not equal at the time of incorporation. 
K E. \Valker's capital account amounted to $40,775.01 
arn1 .J. B. Walker's was $29,143.30 (R. 272). The stock 
of the corporation was issued equally ( Exh. D-25). This 
issuance of equal stock would be consistent with an in-
cuq)Oration of only part of the assets of the partnership 
whif'h ·would result in withdrawals from each of the part-
nn's eapital accounts of an equal amount, but not with 
an i11corporation of all of the assets of the partnership . 
. P'ifth, l\Ir. Cope, a certified public accountant, who 
workf.d on the corporation books extensively in 1958, 
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m attempting to n'conrile the assds of the partn('l'shi]i 
with those of the corporation, te::;tified that from an ac-
counting standpoint it was not possible to n·co1wile thi· 
eorporntion as Jw:ng a suc·eessor of tlH' partnership. (11. 
~77) 
8ixth, the testimony of res1)0ndent is that he diu 
not makP a tl-ansfer of any of the indicia of mn1ership 
of the real property involved in this action, or the stoek~ 
and bonds of the partnership (except for a fow shares of 
one company). l le te:::itii'il'<l that he had tr an sf erred the 
tith's of the <'lluipment. ( R 192-5). This is consistent 
with the testimony of Appellant R. E. \Valker that olll) 
the equipme11t rtrnl operating assets of the partnership 
were transferred to the corporation (R. 259). 
Seventh, the agreeuwnt of respondent and R. E. 
\Valker, in settlement of their Ia-wsuit, contains an agree-
ment by R .. K \Valker to assign to respondent his inter-
eset in the partnership, except for the properties involnd 
in this action (Exh. P-31). This is clearly indicative tlrnt 
in June of 1959 the parties considered that the properti~i 
in this action and otlwr assets were still in the imrbwr-
ship. If all assets of the partnership had been transfenrrl 
to the corporation, there would have been no occasion 
to get an assignmPnt and deed from R. E. \Valker of hi.' 
interest in the paitnaship. 
It is submitted that there vrns no transfer of the 
properties involved in this action from the partnershi11 
to the corporation, and that the court erred in so finding. 
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Tlwr<'i'on•, h)- acquiring tlw corporate stod~ of H. E. 
\\";tll~,.1·, n·:-:pond1•nt C'.ould not have ac<1uired the rights 
((l n·illll>nrs('lllic'llt even if the agreement by ·which he 
aeq n i n·d H. K \Y alkt>r's stoC'.k had been silent on the 
snl1j1•ct. 
The agT('t'llwnt of June, 1959, was not silent on the 
subj<·ct ( E:\.h. P-31). It contains paragraphs which are 
111ost p<'rtin<·nt and enlightening as to the parties' under-
stamli11g about th<-> rights of reimbursement. First, they 
n·(·ogni1wd that the partnership retained some assets, 
and particnlarly those relating to the John A. "\Valker 
('stat1: propt>rty and the Union property. The agreement 
11f lt K \Valk<·r in that instrument reads as follows: 
'' 2. [H. E. vValker agrees] to assign and 
<1uitclaim any interest he has in the old partner-
ship known as "\Valker Trucking Co. and in the 
·w a Iker Saud and Gravel, a co-partnership, except 
that nothing herein contained shall be construed 
as a wain•r on the part of the party of the second 
part IR. K vValker] of any claims he may have 
to the ,John Alvin Walker Estate or the Union 
prnperty as mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 of 
tlie mutual covenants. 
f:\t>c011c1ly, the parties to the agreement anticipated 
the \T»ry issue which is now in litigation-to what extent 
should rf•spondent get credit against the estate for pay-
ment:, niadP by the partnership to acquire or maintain 
th1· i>stah· prorwrty hy reason of acquiring R. E. vValker's 
int1•r\:.•st in tlw corporation t It is difficult to conceive how 
t lit> nlldl'rstanding that respondent should not acquire any 
n1lditional rights could be more clearly stated that in the 
followi11g two sections of the agreement: 
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. "3. It is understood and agreed that thi're 
JS expressly reserved and excluded from tht~ ten . 
and provisions oi this agreement and froni a
1
1
1
1.1 
• • ' <· 1 
relt·ases :xecuted mc1dent thereto, all interest th;t 
the parties hereto may have or claim to haw iri 
the property of the John Alvin Walker Estat
1
, 
and that nothing herein contained shall he l'P' 
garded or construed as an admiE,sion on the part 
of either party that either or both of said partiP, 
shall have, or has, any right title or interest in 
or to said property, and that said property, anu 
all incidents thereof including any and all rnatter1. 
or to soitrce of /mids involved in the acq11isitirn1 
or maintenance of said property, are retained bY 
the respective parties the same as though thi·, 
agreement were never made." 
"4. It is understood and agreed that tlmr, 
is expJ"essly reserved and excluded from the term' 
and provisions of this agreement, and from any 
released executed incident thereto, all intrrM 
that the parties hereto may have or claim to 
have in two pieces of real estate in Union, Utah. 
and that nothing herein contained shall be n 
garded or construed as an admission on the par! 
of either party that either or both of said partie.• 
shall have, or has, any right, title or interest in 
or to said property and that said property, and 
all incidents thereof, including any and all mat 
ters, or to source of funds involved in the acq11i· 
sition or maintenance of said property, are re 
tained by the respective parties the same a1 
though this agreement were never made." [Em-
phasis added.] 
Considering that approximately one-half of th1' 
agreement, exclusive of recitals and property descri11-
tions, is devoted to the above language, one must assume 
that the parties felt the above language an important 
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1,nd qf tli<'ir rn·gotiations. Keverthel<·ss the trial court 
i·uiupl1·idy iµ;nored the agreement and the result the 
qiwt1·cl languag1~ songht to accomplish between the par-
1 ies, a]j(l refus1•d to listen to evidence relating to the 
nnd1•rstanding (H. 371). The court sustained objections 
to inti·u(lndion of this evidence, so an offer of proof 
\I'll s mad<· ( H. :r11). 
ln vi1•\\' of the overwhelming evidence and virtual 
:;tipulation that all of the expenditures for which respon-
dt·nt f'!airns a lit•n were made by the partnership, and 
in Yi('w of tlu~ great care with which R. E. vValker re-
tained his rights to reimbursement for his share of 
iiartnersliip exrwnditures for the estate, we submit that 
the trial court erred in holding that respondent had 
?eqnirea the right to reimbursement for all money paid 
Ji~- hirn~wlf, the partnership or the corporation the same 
as if he had made all the payments out of his own pocket. 
As noted above, the capital accounts of the partner-
ship at the tiirn) of incorporation of the corporation 
~tood 'rith respondent having 41.682 per cent of the net 
worth of the partnership and R. E. Walker having 58.318 
lh'l Ct'Jlt. rl_1Jie incorporation of certain assets of the part-
n<,rship, with the stock for those assets being issued 
1·qnally, would result in equal reductions in the dollar 
amount uf each partner's capital account. The dollar 
difft'l'Pnee i11 the capital accounts after such withdrawal 
wonld be a gn•ater percentage of the whole net worth of 
th 0 partnership, so the effect would be to increase R. E. 
\Valktir's perePntage of the capital and reduce respon-
dent's. f-lince tlw evidence is not available as to how 
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much \Yas in fad \\-it!J(ll'a\Yn from thP partnerslti]i, a11_ 
pc!lant \; co11km1 the principal amount of respondent', 
lie11 should 11<> l'P(lneecl hy at l<•ast 5S.:ns lH'1· (·Pnt. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF DEFENDANT RESPONDENT HAD AC. 
QUIRED ALL HIS PARTNER'S RIGHTS TO REIMBURSE-
MENT BY THEIR 1%9 AGREEJ\IENT, THE COURT ERRED 
IN HOLDING DEFENDANT RESPONDENT WAS EN-
TITLED TO INTEREST FROM 1922 INSTEAD OF FRmr 
1959 WHEN HE ACTUALLY PAID THE MONEY FOR RE-
IMBURSEMENT RIGHTS. 
r_}'he tr]al court ap1wared to n'cognizP that any claim 
defendant n·spondent might make to having "bought 
his partner out" must be bast>d on fop 1959 agreenwnt 
betwetin them (Exhibit P-31). 
Ass'..uning (although this violates the letter a111l 
spirit of the agn't>ill<'nt) that d<'frndant-respondent some-
how acquired his partner's rights to reimburse11wnt h) 
that agreement, we would point out that his partnel'. 
plaintiff appellant R. I<~. \Valker, had no i·ights of any 
kind und<ff the 1922 contract \\'hich is th<' basis of this 
litigation. The only party to the 19:22 contract who l1a~ 
rights to reimbursement is defendant respondent and lll' 
is entitled to reimhursic•ment \\·ith interest from his co· 
heirs but only for amounts b_• pi:>rsonally pays. Hr i~ 
only entitled to inh·n·st, fnrthennon·, from th<~ date h~ 
personally makes an expenditure on behalf of the estat1' 
and is eonseqlwntly "out of pocket." 
Defendant-respondent was cPrtainly not out of pork· 
et with reference to expenditures made by R. E. Walhr 
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1, iUwr as an individual or as tlw major partiwr in tlw 
.1. I\. IC J·:. \\"alkn iiartnnshi1J) until lw (by tlw trial 
""mt's inn<·dihl<> ('Onstrnetion of Exhibit J>-:·H) bought 
1dtat('\"<·r rigltts I.{. E. Walk('l' had in 1939. Defendant 
n·;-;pornl<'nt sl1ould not, in equitr, be given credit for his 
l~';)~J 1•:,]H'rnliture as if he had made it in 1922. 
\Y<' \1·01dd n·-<·mphasiie that R. E. ·walker had no 
rjgltts under the 1922 contract. If .r. B. \Valker acquired 
H. K Walkt>r':-; rights to reimbursement (despite R. E. 
\\'alkPr's ('onsistt>nt attempts to retain those rights), 
1111· rights so acquired have tht>ir basis in general prin-
l'ipl1·s of law and not in the 1922 contract. rrhere is no 
pussihl1' basis on ·which R. E. \Valker could have been 
e11titl<'d to reimbursement plus interest at 8 per cent 
sine<' tlH~ !('gal rate of interest is only G per cent. 
Ln making this argument, we do not retreat, of 
coLm.;e, from our basic position ( 1) that no rights with 
refrren<'e to the estate property were ever conveyed to 
the ('Orporation, (2) that R. E. \Yalhr preserved for 
himsP!f all rights to reimbursement derived from his 
slutn' of partnership money used for estate purposes 
and ( :i) that, by acquiring all the stock in the corpor-
ation, dd<'ndant-respondent could not have ac(1uired any 
riglits with reference to the estate property. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS-AP-
PF:LLANTS' MOTION TO AMEND THE FINDINGS AND 
.JUDGMENT TO PROVIDE THAT, IN THE EVENT PLAIN-
TIFFS-APPELLANTS FAILED TO PAY THE AMOUNT OF 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S LIEN WITHIN THIRTY 
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DAYS AFTER DEMAND, THEN DEFENDANT-RESPON. 
DENT SHOULD BE ENTITLED ONLY TO FORECLOSE 
HIS LIEN. 
The history of the \Valker family possession of thi· 
property in litigation has (since the Dayton mortgagt 
and other liens wPre discharged) been that Minnetta 
\Valker, the mother of the living litigants, occupi\•d tlie 
home and exercised some dominion over it until lier 
death in 1959 at the age of eight-six. For about t1·n 
years after the 1922 agreement, defendant-respondent 
and his wife and family lived in the home too (R-:211). 
All the children assmned that, -when their mother dircL 
an equitable division of the property would be made 
with appropriatt~ consideration being given to the 19~~ 
efforts of tht> two oldest children to preserve the estatl·. 
It was not until 1960, after Minetta's death, that the 
intention of defendant-respondent to disenfranchise hi' 
brothers and sisters became known. It -was not until 
after the judgment in this action was filed that demand 
was made upon plaintiffs-appellants to produce tlw 
$20,000.00 which the Court had found to be the amount 
of the lien. 
The property in litigation has been appraised at 
approximately $80,000.00 but the interest of plaintiffs-
appellants is an undivided interest, and the lands are 
for the most part unimproved. As a matter of banking 
practice, loans on unimproved lands are not made, par· 
ticularly where the prospective borrower can only en-
cumber an undivided interest. The trial court decreed 
that, if plaintiffs-appellants failed to raise $20,000.00 
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'·' it!i m tlti rty days afh·r demand, their entire interest 
.-lio111ld IH' forfPifr<l, and defendant-respondent would then 
Jwlu the entire estate free of any rlaim by them. 
Tlie ]>radical effect of the decree is to work a for-
fri tun· of the inh•n·sts of all the heirs of John A. 
Walker except defendant-rPspondent. This is most cer-
tainly not the spirit or the content of the 1922 agreement. 
TJiat agn~ernent provides that defendant-respondent 
shall have a lien only, a lien which he might establish 
at an)' time hy making demand on his co-heirs for pay-
ment, hut nonetheless a mere lien. 
Hecognizing the imminence of forfeiture, plaintiffs-
appellants moved (R-86, 87) to have the judgment 
amen<l(•d, and the Court denied the motion. 
In ('Ss<>nee, the deed by which defendant-respondent 
acquin•d his title was a mortgage of a kind which this 
Court ha8 often recognized (Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 
4Ji2, 189 P.2d 118;Hess v. Anger, 53 Utah 186, 177 Pac. 
232). His lien is an obligation established by an instru-
HH~nt in writing which did not, in terms, contemplate any 
r:Oll\'('Yance to defendant-respondent. 
The procedure for the recovery of a debt or the 
ellforccment of a right secured by a mortgage upon real 
estate is statutory, in this state, and the statutory fore-
doHure procedure is the only procedure by which a 
li0 n may be enforced. Section 78-37-1, U.C.A. 1953 reads 
as follcnrn: 
''There can be but one action for the recovery 
of a11y debt or the enforcement of any right se-
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eun•d L~- rnortµ;ap;(' npon !'<>al ('Slat<• or jJ('J'S'.mnl 
property, which action nrn:-;t }w in ac<·o1'(1arn·<· wit], 
the provisions of this ehapt('l'. .Jndµ;rn<>Ht sltal! J
11
'. 
given adjudging tlw amount duP, \Yitli eosb and 
disbUl'Sl'lllents, and the salP of tlH' rnortgn;.:·t·(i 
property, or SOll!l' part tlwn•of, to satisl\ sair] 
amount and accruing eosts and din·di1w tl 11• ' h • 
sh(•rif f to procl•ed and s<·ll the sam<' aeconling t:i 
the prnvisions of law J'('lating to sal(•s OH PX<·cu-
tion, and a special <'Xt>eution or ord<>r of sa]1• 
shall be issued for that purpose. 
\Vlwn the trial court denit>d tlw motion to m~Mid 
the judg11wnt to l'l'qnire foi't>elosnn• and iwrsi:-;trd iil ib 
decree that the substantial intPrPst of plaintifL-a1ipl·1 
lants be forf'eitt>d \Yithont l10pt• of redemption unl<·~, 
they produce a sum it is not in thtiir })OW\l' to producP, 
the Court aetecl against the l~,_,,. and against furnlm1wn'«1: 
pl'inciples of jurisprmknt'c. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT, BY ACQUIR-
ING ALL OF THE STOCK IN J.B. AND R. E. WALKER, INC .. 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT ACQUIRED ANY RIGHTS TO 
REIMBURSEl\IENT FROM THE ESTATE OF JOHN A 
WALKER SINCE ANY RIGHTS OF THAT CORPORATIO~­
WHETHER ACQUIRED FROM THE R. E.-J. B. WALKER 
PARTNERSHIP OR OTHERWISE - WERE BARRED BY 
THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. 
As we hav<:> voirited out in argument unclN pn·vio111 
points, the .Court repeatedly ltelcl that defendant-n,:.;pon-
clent should have credit for all expenditures contemplafrcl 
by the 1922 contract whether they were in faet mml1' h: 
himself, the J. B.-R. E. ~Walker partnel'ship or .J. H. 
and R. E. \Valker, Inc. 
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'l'lw ( 'omt\i th< 1ory, if we urnl<·rstand it, is that the 
par!r1••1;-;liip '"·a:-: <·ntitled to h<~ reimburs0d for <'x1wndi-
tun·:-; tnad<' IJ~· it on behalf of tlw estatP - quite apart 
!'rn1n (}w 1 !):.!~ agr<'ement - and dpfendant-respondent 
acqni r1·d tlimw rights when tie acquic·ed the total stock 
in tlw corporation. 
W<· Jwv<· already pointed out that the corporation 
1wwr acq 11ire<l R E. \Valk<~r's or the partnership's 
rigl1b '' ith rd<'n·nce to the estate. Those rights were 
iWY<'l' com'f',\'Cd to the corporation, and they were, in 
l'~wt, ean•fully preserved to plaintiff-appellant R. I~. 
\Yalker in <'Y<>ry a('count, record, contract and written 
1nrn:.;adio11. ThP trial court simply ignored the nass 
of \nitkn <·vi<lPnce that defendant-respondent had not 
pcr;-;onall~· paid the Dayton mortgage and had not ac-
1111in·d tlw rights to n•imbursement of the partnership, 
wltid1 n 1 ally paid it, or plaintiff-appellant R. E. \Valker. 
Th<· trial eonrt would not even receive evidence of the 
t>xtent 10 which payments had been made out of partner-
~:li1p funds. 
En1n if, by acquiring the total issued stock, defen-
(~a1tl-respomlPnt had acquired whatever rights the part-
JWtship or corporation had, hO\\Yver, we submit that 
iwitlH·r <·ntity had any rights. 
:\ eitlwr tlw partnership nor the corporation was a 
rnrt>· to tli1· J ~l22 eon tract an<l there is no instrument 
('~tal>Ji:-;liil1g Ow right of either to sit on its rights to 
l'(·i111liu l':-:e111<•nt or to have a lien in the property. Each 
had a h·g-al or t>quitable right to be reimbursed by the 
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estate for expenditures made on the estate's behalf. 
Neither made a claim, however, within six or even ten 
years after the expenditure was made. Defendant-rp 
spondent could not, by acquiring the corporation's stock 
I 
acquire any right the corporation did not then hare. 
rrhe corporation's rights, if any it ever had, had lonn 
b 
since become unenforceable by reason of the limitations 
of actions provisions of the Utah Code. \Ve assume Sec-
tion 78-12-25 would be the applicable provision, but wr 
are aware of no kind of action which may be asserter! 
forty years after it arises. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs-appellants do not seek to keep from de-
fendant-respondent any profit or advantage to which be 
is entitled under the 1922 contract. To the extent that 
he was out of pocket in arranging for the payment of 
the Dayton mortgage and the other expenditures whicl1 
are the subject of the 1922 contract, plaintiffs belieYe 
he should be fully reimbursed with interest. 
Plaintiffs-appellants cannot agree, however, that 
defendant-respondent should be reimbursed for expendi-
tures made by someone else. They are even ·willing that 
he should be given credit for having paid a part of 
the amounts really paid by the partnership. No possible 
basis is seen, however, for crediting defendant-respun· 
dent with all the payments made by the partnership, 
particularly when his partner made so careful a record 
of the understanding between the partners that defen· 
dant-respondent should not be given such credit. 
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\\' c propose an entirt>ly equitable formula for de-
tennining the amount of defendant's lien. \Ve believe 
tlw evidt'nte is dear and convincing that one-fourth 
of the money raisPd hy the Dayton Mortgage was used 
to satisfy a partnership mortgage. One-fourth of the 
$3,002.50 paid to recover the property from the Daytons 
was therefon~ a partnership obligation, and defendant 
should get no credit for the partnership's having paid 
that. 
Of the rcmammg $4,364.00, defendant should get 
r1w1it only for the part of it which would have been 
distrihnkd to him if it hadn't been so expended. On the 
hasis of the partnership's capital accounts, it is assumed 
his share would have been 41.682 per cent. 
The record shows that defendant-respondent re-
et>iv~d $250.00 for granting a right of way across the 
property. vV e believe this amount should be deducted 
from the amount of his lien. 
Finally, we believe the rights of the plaintiffs-ap-
1wllants should not be subject to forfeit if they cannot 
prodnee the amount of the lien. We believe the lien 
should be foreclosed in the manner provided by statute. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK J. ALLEN 
THOMASC. CUTHBERT 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
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